The immediate postwar period saw the emergence of the first digital computers as well as developments in cybernetics, brain research, and information theory. In this era, questions of mechanical intelligence came to the forefront in public media. In Britain the BBC broadcast radio talks by many leading practitioners in these fields in which they discussed their work and speculated on its implications for conceptions of intelligence. Generally, speakers were either skeptical or unskeptical toward the issue of intelligent behavior in machines. The skeptics, who tended to have backgrounds in physical science and mathematics, usually took reductive approaches to argue that machines could not be intelligent. The nonskeptics, who tended to have a biological orientation, usually avoided reductive approaches and conceded that the distinction between machines and animal brains might not be clear-cut. These differing interpretations of new technology, their association with distinct intellectual traditions, and their promotion via a wide-reaching and respected medium are seen as instances of social shaping of technology in action.
This article concerns the early radio coverage of what might be called "machine intelligence" on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) during the first decade after the Second World War. This period saw the emergence of the first stored-program digital computers, the birth of cybernetics, and advances in the investigation of live brains by monitoring their electrical activity. Computers, cybernetics, and brain research might seem to have little connection with each other, but during this period they formed a nexus for interdisciplinary discussion of machine and animal intelligence.
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I claim no originality for bringing together computers, cybernetics, and brain research. Recent studies of cybernetics have explored the overlap between these three fields in the immediate postwar period. 1 However, there are good reasons to concentrate on BBC radio coverage in this period rather than, say, press coverage. In the first place, the BBC often commissioned presentations from the scientists, engineers, mathematicians, biologists, and cyberneticists concerned rather than from journalists or commentators.
Another reason for concentrating on the BBC is its status within British society. It attempted to cater to all tastes (though how successfully is debatable), enjoyed an enhanced reputation following the Second World War, and had no significant broadcasting competition within Britain. Its broadcasting activity was therefore outside the market system of mass media. This does not mean that the BBC was indifferent to popular tastes, but the content of its programs taken as a whole could be extraordinarily wide-ranging.
The broadcasts I cover were produced by the Talks Department, would typically have been approximately twenty minutes long, and were billed in advance in listings. Talks on computers, cybernetics, and brain research were relatively plentiful (see the appendix for a selective list), and although hardly any audio recordings survive, many text transcripts exist at the BBC's Written Archives Centre at Caversham in the UK. Some talks were published, albeit abridged, in the weekly BBC magazine the Listener. Radio exceeded television in popularity at this time, although television's popularity accelerated fast during the later 1950s. Many of the broadcasts discussed below were transmitted on the new Third Programme, a national radio network inaugurated in September 1946. The Third Programme supplemented two already existing national radio networks (hence the name "Third"), and its purpose was avowedly intellectual and cultural. Audiences for broadcasts on the Third were much smaller than audiences for broadcasts on the two other services, the Light Programme and the Home Service.
2 Before looking at the broadcasts themselves, I offer some reflections drawn from other scholars on technological history.
Technology
Carolyn Marvin, in her study of the development of electrical communications technology during the nineteenth century, writes: "The early history of electric media is less the evolution of technical efficiencies in communication than a series of arenas for negotiating issues crucial to the conduct of social life; among them, who is inside and outside, who may speak, who may not, and who has authority and may be believed. Changes in the speed, capacity and performance of communications devices tell us little about these questions." Marvin implies here that technological history is too often wrongly presented as artifacts undergoing continual refinement toward their present form. Such histories tend to begin with the artifact itself, and its social aspects are structured around its technological properties. Marvin shifts the focus from the artifact to "the drama in which existing groups perpetually negotiate power, authority, representation and knowledge with whatever resources are available." Among the "resources" available to disputants are newly emerging technologies onto which "old habits of transacting between groups are projected." 3 Numerous sociohistorical case studies of technology (including Marvin's) have shown that during the early phases of a technology there is often a good deal of uncertainty about what purpose the technology serves and what it signifies. 4 Historians of technology have sometimes been guilty of anachronistically reading present-day attitudes into the past. From such anachronisms, "Whig" histories of technology are constructed that lead deterministically and progressively from the past to the present. 5 A corollary of this deterministic view is a tendency to think that the meaning of a technology is embedded in the technology's functional attributes. Menahem Blondheim, writing in the context of communication technology, expresses this idea as "a tendency to consider media technologies as lucid and unambiguous, and to interpret them on their own terms." The trouble with this view is that it "tends to overlook the mutability of technologies, their potential adaptation, transformation and reinvention in the course of their diffusion and use." 6 The multiple interpretations of emerging technologies are aspects of what Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker refer to as interpretative flexibility. When there is no stable, universally accepted interpretation of a technology, a shared interpretation can become the marker of a "relevant social group": "The key requirement [of a relevant social group] is that all members of a certain social group share the same set of meanings, attached to a specific artefact." 7 The virtue, therefore, of looking at early accounts of computers and associated technologies is that we see interpretations of the technology proposed as the technology itself is created (and even before it is created). In the following narrative, for example, we see particular groups of scientists alluding to the new machines in support of particular views about the nature of intelligence and thought.
The period of the late 1940s and early 1950s saw the creation of the first stored-program digital computers. However, their appearance was not without historical context. Mechanical and electromechanical calculating machines had already existed in various forms for several decades. 8 For some of the radio broadcasters discussed in this article, the postwar digital computers belonged squarely within that context. Even broadcasters who appreciated that the new computers potentially raised philosophical issues-specifically their apparent capacity for autonomous action-were likely to cite precedents, in particular Charles Babbage's unbuilt analytical engine (ca. 1837) and Ada Lovelace's assurance that such a machine could not be regarded as truly autonomous. Another part of the historical context of the new machines, though, remained uncited. This was the wartime code-breaking work at Bletchley Park and the construction of the Bombes and the Colossus machines. Some speakers in the broadcasts had worked at Bletchley Park during the war, and the expertise they developed there informed their postwar work with mechanical intelligence, although they were silent on this matter.
Sir Charles Darwin and the ACE
One of the first broadcasts related to computers was a short talk by Sir Charles Darwin (grandson of the evolutionary biologist) on the Home Service on November 9, 1946, announcing the project to build the Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) at the UK's National Physical Laboratory. Other British projects to create general-purpose computers were begun at around the same time, although none were operational until a few years after Darwin's announcement.
Darwin framed the new ACE machine as a tool for mathematics, both theoretical and applied. Regarding the theoretical aspect, he related the ACE to a hypothetical concept Alan Turing had invoked in a paper published in 1937 as part of Turing's thought experiment to solve a problem in mathematical logic. 9 Turing's hypothetical device could be programmed to perform any algorithmic task (i.e., a task capable of being formulated in a finite set of instructions, which we would now call a program). Turing did not require that any such machine should actually be built as part of his proof, but Darwin alluded to it in the context of the new machine: "For a long time mathematicians have been occupied in getting better logical foundations for their subject, and in this field, about twelve years ago, a young Cambridge Mathematician by the name of Turing, wrote a paper which appeared in one of the mathematical journals, in which he worked out by strict logical principles, how far a machine could be imagined which would imitate the processes of thought."
10 Darwin commented that the project had been referred to as an "electronic brain," and this characterization was to pervade much further discussion of computers. From the announcement of the ACE project to a few years afterward, the British press had frequently referred to the new computers as "brains" or "electronic brains." 11 Comparing the proposed ACE machine (which Turing designed) with the electronic computational devices already in use in the United States, Darwin observed: "We are ambitious enough to hope that we are going to get a machine which will be able to do more things than theirs, that in fact it will correspond to a rather higher level of the brain."
12 In other words, the British machine was expected to have a more sophisticated repertoire of operations than the American computers. Darwin described the potential of the ACE to take alternative actions depending on whether the result of a calculation was, for example, greater than seven or not. This modest-sounding capability turned out to engender a lot of discussion in later broadcasts.
The outlines of much subsequent discussion of computers were drawn by Darwin in this short broadcast. First, Darwin indicated that the devices would perform calculations very quickly. Second, he alluded to the machines as "brains." Third, Darwin introduced an esoteric aspect: these devices in some way related to deep mathematical theory. Darwin even referred to the ACE machine as a realization of Turing's hypothetical machine: "Turing, who is now on our staff, is showing us how to make his idea come true." There was, as yet, no suggestion of anxiety associated with these machines. They were presented as unproblematic scientific and mathematical tools.
Douglas Hartree
A month after Darwin's broadcast, on December 11, 1946 , the mathematician Douglas Hartree spoke about computers on the Home Service's regular topical scientific program, Science Survey. In the immediate prewar period, Hartree had been associated with developments in analog computing at Manchester University. 13 Analog computers, unlike digital computers, modeled real-world systems physically as specially configured electrical, mechanical, or hydraulic systems that were designed to behave analogously to the systems under investigation. Analog computers arrived at answers to problems by emulation rather than calculation. A slide rule is a very basic form of analog computer, for example.
At the time of his 1946 Science Survey broadcast (and of his 1951 broadcast referred to later) Hartree was the Plummer Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge University. During the broadcast, Hartree described the lineage of postwar digital computers. This lineage included adding machines and the work of the nineteenth-century British mathematician Charles Babbage. Analog computers were mentioned as a separate but related branch of mechanical computation. 14 According to Hartree, the computing machines in development at the time of his talk, of which the ACE was an example, would be capable of conditional operations. That is, the operation performed depended on the outcome of a test on an intermediate result, such as whether one number was bigger than another number.
Hartree conceded that a degree of anthropomorphism was excusable: "This faculty endows the machine with what I think is not unfair to call a limited amount of judgement."
15 But Hartree objected to the term "electronic brain" being attached to such machines because the programmer (as we would now say) had to determine in advance all the program's possible courses of action. The computer's apparent autonomy was illusory. As for the practical applications of computers, Hartree was clear: their role was to do existing calculations quicker, or to make formerly unfeasible calculations feasible. The possibility of entirely new applications was not mentioned.
The First Working Computers
The three main British computers under development during the second half of the 1940s-at Manchester University, Cambridge University, and the National Physical Laboratory, London-became operational within a short time of each other. Manchester University's Mark 1 Prototype was functioning between April 1949 and August 1950, having been developed from an earlier test machine. It was replaced in February 1951 by the Ferranti Mark 1. Cambridge University's EDSAC (Electronic Delay Storage Automatic Computer) was operational in May 1949, and the ACE machine announced by Darwin was not completed until late 1951 (although a pilot device was operating experimentally in 1950). 16 The appearance of these new machines in the early 1950s prompted several broadcasts focusing on their potential for human-like behavior. No broadcaster claimed that the existing machines could seriously be described as "brain-like." The issue was whether machines of this type might one day be capable of brain-like behavior or whether they were in principle incapable of such behavior.
The physicist, information theorist, and reconciler of science and religious faith Donald MacKay thought that computers being developed at this time could never plausibly be described as brain-like. In his 1986 Gifford Lectures, MacKay said this of his outlook during this time: "As an analogue computer man, I felt strongly convinced that the brain, whatever it was, was not a digital computer. I didn't think it was an analogue computer either, in the conventional sense. But this naturally rubbed under my skin the question: well, if it is not either of these, what kind of system is it?" 17 In the two-part broadcast titled Mind-Like Behaviour in Machines (June 10 and 16, 1950, Third Programme), MacKay, by way of demonstration of the nonbrain status of the digital computer, explained binary representation of numbers and the internal storage used by computers. By showing that computers' fundamental operations were banal and elementary, MacKay emphasized the mechanistic, nonhuman character of computers. However, given the prevailing ignorance of how human brains worked, it is unclear why this tactic should be thought to have demonstrated anything about the capacity of machines for thinking.
MacKay considered that even when a computer performed higherlevel tasks, such as "choosing" from alternative actions and deducing conclusions from premises, one should not be deceived: "[Computer operations] are all mind-like activities in a sense, and it is not difficult to design a computer in which they are so co-ordinated that it appears to think." MacKay made a crucial distinction between thinking and the appearance of thinking. He then went on to give further characterizations of computers that implicitly distinguished them from humans: "Its opinions are not its own; it lacks imagination; the purposes it pursues are those specified by the designer; its reasoning, even if it could in principle cover a much wider field than that of chess, is entirely 'black-and-white,' and takes no account of subtleties of meaning." 18 If it occurred to MacKay that humans sometimes display these qualities too, he did not mention it. His tactic for showing that computers could not be brain-like was an often-used one: to outline some of the fundamental mechanisms by which computers work and to point to their inability to emulate certain aspects of human behavior such as creativity, originality, and empathy.
In MacKay's second broadcast in the series on June 16, 1950, he envisaged a type of machine closer to that implemented in the neural networks used in present-day artificial intelligence. He spoke of a "pattern of behaviour which we can define statistically in terms of probable reactions to given situations." A machine showing such behavior could more convincingly imitate humans, he suggested. MacKay imagined this kind of behavior being implemented in the hardware rather than, as in presentday artificial intelligence, at the level of the program through the use of electronic gates that would open only when a signal exceeded a certain bias level: "We can cause the bias level to fluctuate in a random way and so, for a given intensity of signal and range of fluctuation, we can say that the electrical bias is directly related to the improbability that the gate will open."
19 Thus MacKay appears to have visualized this probabilistic behavior as requiring an entirely new type of machine different in kind from those that were coming into existence at the time of his broadcast.
"Automatic Calculating Machines" and Turing
Further computer-related broadcasts followed throughout 1951, notably the series of five talks on automatic calculating machines broadcast from May 5 to June 5 and given by Douglas Hartree, Max Newman, Alan Turing, Freddie Williams, and Maurice Wilkes. 20 Of these speakers, Newman and Turing were Bletchley Park veterans.
Apart from Freddie Williams, who was an engineer associated with the Manchester University machine, the speakers said little about the hardware, concentrating instead on software concepts such as programs, data, subroutines, and so on. They also touched on the recurring theme of what a computer program could and could not do in principle. There were repeated assertions about the inappropriateness of attributing autonomous, intelligent behavior to computers. Hartree, for instance, said: "But do not jump to the conclusion that . . . the machine is thinking for itself. All these instructions for modifying other instructions, and for evaluating and using [them] as the criteria of any discrimination, all have to be thought out and programmed in detail." Hartree acknowledged that his line of argument was the same as that advanced by Ada Lovelace a century before in connection with Babbage's unbuilt analytical engine: "Lady Lovelace, daughter of the poet Byron, wrote of Babbage's projected analytical engine 'The machine has no pretensions to originate anything; it will only do what we know how to order it to perform.'" Hartree then cautiously appended, "I do not say, however, that this will necessarily remain true of all future machines." 21 The implication of the Ada Lovelace argument was that if the computer were to act in an unforeseeable way, one might concede some degree of autonomy to its activity. Max Newman, professor of mathematics at Manchester University, in his broadcast on May 8, 1951, cautiously diverged from this argument: "It is not difficult to make up programmes of moderate length leading to networks of operations so complex that even the composer cannot predict what course the calculations will take. . . . In view of these facts it seems that the dictum of Lady Lovelace, as quoted by Professor Hartree, . . . needs to be received with some reserve."
22 Alan Turing, though, in his broadcast on May 15, 1951, took up this very point to argue against making an "in principle" distinction between computing machines and brains. Almost a year had passed since the publication of his now-famous Mind article in which he discussed whether computers could be said to think and proposed the test-by-imitation that bears his name. 23 At the outset of his broadcast, Turing made his position clear. He pointed out that although digital computers had often been described as brains, for most scientists this was little more than a "newspaper stunt." However, "one mathematician has expressed the opposite point of view to me rather forcefully in the words, 'It is commonly said that these machines are not brains, but you and I know that they are.'" 24 Turing's talk was an argument in support of this point of view, although he was clear that existing machines, or rather the programs that ran on them, could not reasonably be described as such.
For Turing, Ada Lovelace's argument-that when programming a computer all eventualities had to be accommodated, and, therefore, computers could not in principle be regarded as brains-was unconvincing. Planning for all eventualities, Turing observed, is not the same as knowing in advance what those eventualities will be: "But there is no need to suppose that when we give it its orders we know what we are doing, what the consequences of these orders are going to be." 25 Andrew Hodges has suggested that Turing's argument could have originated from his personal experiences using the electromechanical "Bombes" to decrypt German Enigma-coded messages at Bletchley Park during the Second World War: "Breaking the enigma led Turing into devising the most sophisticated algorithm ever used, with the ingenious parallel logic of the Bombes. Its speed of implementation clearly outpaced the capacities of human operators. But beyond that, his advanced Bayesian methods for evaluating weight of evidence showed how the application of rule-based methods could supersede reliance on intuitive judgment." 26 The essence of Turing's argument in his broadcast was that if the brain was a machine (albeit a biological machine), then a machine could be a brain: "If it is accepted that real brains, as found in animals, and in particular in men, are a sort of machine, it will follow that our digital computer, suitably programmed, will behave like a brain."
27 Such a line of argument requires clarification of what is meant by "machine." In everyday parlance, "machine" connotes several things, but typically it is an engineered artifact designed to perform tasks repetitively, or as required, and not endowed with consciousness, emotion, and understanding. Turing's biographer, Andrew Hodges, observed that Turing's view of what constituted a machine or a mechanical process, as inferred from several of his writings, however, was not completely fixed. 28 The principal meaning of "mechanical" for Turing was "algorithmic," that is, operating according to a finite set of instructions that, in their context of use, are explicit, unambiguous, and capable of being performed. The new digital computers were algorithmic, but they were also discrete-state (i.e., digital) machines engaged in computable operations. In discretestate machines only certain states are possible, or only certain states matter in the algorithm's execution, as the intermediate states during transitions have no significance to the outcome. The extent to which human and animal minds could be likened to digital computers was unclear, but Turing held that brains of all kinds must be governed by physical laws. Between computability (i.e., algorithmic executability) and law-governed behavior there was no obvious connection. For instance, might a brain, though governed by physical laws, be capable of processes that were not possible in principle for an algorithmic machine? As Hodges concludes: "[Turing's] later writings show more awareness of the problem of connecting computability with physical law."
29

Learning and the Machine
According to Wolfe Mays, a philosopher at Manchester University during the 1950s, Turing's pronouncements about mechanical brains "set off a debate on artificial intelligence which still continues today." 30 Mays himself gave a broadcast titled "Machine Process and Thought Process" on December 5, 1956 , that was a contribution to the debate. His opening sentence indicated, albeit flippantly, how the idea of a rule-following autonomous machine played to anxieties about totalitarian malevolence: "I recently attended an International Congress on Cybernetics in Belgium. On the little yellow badge they gave us to wear there was the picture of a robot caught in the act of performing a goosestep." 31 The purpose of his broadcast was not scaremongering but to present a riposte to Turing and to ideas in the developing field of cybernetics. 32 Mays posited that what we consider as "thinking" in humans and animals was intimately associated with processes that were not capable of being emulated in the computing programs or cybernetic machines of his day. In particular, he was concerned with how prevailing ideas of machine learning in cybernetics were based on a technique of reinforcing actions that were close to the desired action, as one might train an animal, leading to a progressive reduction of error. 33 Humans and animals, when trained in this way, displayed the phenomenon of sudden error reduction: "The errors made [by humans] during learning a task won't always gradually decrease . . . but may exhibit sudden drops, as if something akin to insight had occurred." 34 Machines did not act in this way, and for Mays this distinction was crucial. However, Mays presented the gaining of insight as a paradigm for human learning in general. Some forms of learning, though, are not accompanied by insight. For instance, much language acquisition or skills development is not accompanied by sudden insights. As so often in these debates about mechanical intelligence, a feature of human behavior that was not universal or invariable was presented as a litmus test for demarcating humans from machines.
Brain Research
From earlier parts of this article it can be seen that a standard ploy for denying machines the ability to think was to expose the fundamental processes of computers (such as arithmetical operations on binary numbers) on the assumption that the fundamental level was where one might ultimately distinguish between mechanical and nonmechanical behavior. Even as the new computing machines were coming into existence, however, brain researchers were suggesting that at some level, possibly not the most fundamental level, animal brains appeared to be somewhat machine-like.
In October, November, and December 1950, the influential British zoologist and neurophysiologist John Zachary Young delivered the annual BBC Reith lectures "Doubt and Certainty in Science: A Biologist's Reflections on the Human Brain" on the Home Service, repeated a few weeks later on the Third Programme. The second lecture of the series was entitled "Brains as Machines." Young introduced his topic as follows: "I want here to describe the parts that make up the nervous system and to show how we can speak about them by comparison with machines." 35 In the third lecture, "The Human Calculating Machine," Young observed: "It is not at all impossible that [the brain] acts like an adding machine in some ways."
36 Much of Young's experimental work involved octopuses and the sorts of behavior they manifested: "What makes the octopus steer towards a crab but away from a shark? Some of the most recent calculating machines come close to making such decisions." 37 So whereas other commentators had suggested that the decisionmaking ability of computers gave a false impression of intelligence, Young thought that it offered a useful model for intelligent behavior in animals. Again unlike other commentators, Young did not think that invoking fundamental processes allowed one to conclude much about thinking ability. He commented on the dangers of reductive thinking when living subjects were under investigation: "What I want to criticize is the idea that by dividing and dividing one will ultimately find in some way the real or true unit, which gives full knowledge of the body." 38 Young would presumably have been unsympathetic toward attempts to deny machines the ability to think by reference to their fundamental processes. For Young, such reductive approaches were invalid in both biology and physics: "Biology, like physics, has ceased to be materialist. Its basic unit is something non-material, namely, normally an organization." 39 In this view, an ability to think would be something like an emergent property arising from complex interactions between processes in the brain. However, Young was wary of attributing what he called "occult qualities" to organisms. These were qualities that were not directly observable. "Consciousness" was one such occult quality, and he speculated that psychology traded heavily in such qualities: "May it be that the terminology of psychology consists of a series of occult qualities?" 40 Although Young did not cite "thinking" as an occult quality, it fits his description. Occult qualities were at best provisional forms of explanation, justifiable for their utility in the absence of anything better: "[Occult qualities] are models, if you like, used for convenience of description; we can do without them when we get better ones. Take the case of consciousness. In order to talk we postulate this entity [i.e., consciousness] as a kind of something within ourselves." 41 Young's view of intelligent behavior in this series was at odds with the prevailing view of the physical scientists and mathematicians who had broadcast. Unlike them, he saw a virtue in likening a brain and a computer to each other and considered that reducing each to its fundamental processes did not illuminate their differences or similarities. Such reductive approaches eliminated the crucial issue of organization. Young, presumably because of his biological background, was more inclined to take a systems view and to see that systems could be similar even when their elementary components were very different.
Cybernetics
Another broadcaster with a biological background was the neurophysiologist and cyberneticist W. Grey Walter. While working at the Burden Institute in Bristol, he developed in 1948-49 the electronic "tortoises" for which he is remembered.
The tortoises were battery powered, autonomous, wheeled devices. 42 The back wheels, driven by an electric motor, propelled the tortoise. Another motor steered the tortoise by steadily turning the front wheel's plane of rotation around a vertical axis, continually changing the tortoise's direction of motion. In a free-running state, the tortoise progressed in "a kind of cycloidal wandering" in nonoverlapping loops. 43 Two conditions would change this behavior. Striking an obstacle would activate a switch on the body of the device, resulting in the tortoise moving alternately backward and forward until free. And a source of illumination near the tortoise was detected by a photocell above the front wheel, causing it to steer straight toward the source, although as the tortoise got near the source it would turn away. The tortoise's behavior seemed purposeful and, within a narrow range of activity, intelligent.
Walter's tortoises were not computers. Compared to the new computers of the era they were simple devices, operating on entirely different principles from computers. Nevertheless, in a context where many people were exercised about the potential of machines for brain-like behavior, the work of Grey Walter and other cyberneticists often seemed to be akin to that of the early computer builders. However, as Andrew Pickering points out, what the cyberneticists sought to emulate with their devices was not the knowledge or reasoning ability of the animal brain but its ability to adapt to and act within its environment. 44 This was a distinctively biological approach to intelligent behavior. A few months before building his tortoises, Grey Walter gave his first radio broadcast during which he spoke about the devices he intended to make. His broadcast endowed the tortoises with many more capabilities than they turned out to have:
In shape it would be rather like a tortoise, you could tell that it disliked cold, damp weather, because it would moan pitifully at temperatures below 40°, and humidities above 80%. What is more, it would run towards any source of warmth, but would avoid great heat and bright lights. In the evening, it would come out from under the sofa and sit by the fire, or nestle against your leg, but it would scuttle back to its hiding place at a loud sound or sudden movement and could only be enticed out again by a low whistle.
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Grey Walter went on in this fanciful vein, saying the machine would register a ring at the door, demonstrate a preference for women over men, give intruders electric shocks, and so on. He referred to it as a "mechanical pet" and even hinted at something like Turing's imitation test: "When it is finished I challenge anyone to tell whether or not it is living, without prolonged observation." 46 Grey Walter made further tortoises with additional capabilities, although none of them were as versatile as his broadcast claimed they would be.
Pickering points out that despite its simplicity, the tortoise's interactions with its environment were often surprising and unpredictable, although usually explicable afterward: "A reductive knowledge of components does not necessarily translate into a predictive understanding of aggregate performance-one still has to run the machine [i.e., the tortoise] and find out what it will do." 47 This echoes Turing's comment that the programmer of a computer sometimes did not know what the program's outcome would be.
Sir Geoffrey Jefferson, a British neurologist and neurosurgeon, responded to Grey Walter in a Third Programme broadcast on September 14, 1949, though without naming Walter directly. 48 Jefferson was skeptical about mechanical intelligence and was later to debate the topic with Alan Turing in a radio discussion in 1952. 49 In his 1949 broadcast, Jefferson belittled Grey Walter's tortoise: "It should be possible to construct a simple animal such as a tortoise that would show by its movements that it disliked bright lights, cold and damp, and be apparently frightened by loud noises. . . . [It] might cause the credulous to exclaim 'This is indeed an animal.' I imagine, however, that a real tortoise would quickly find it a puzzling companion and a disappointing mate." 50 One might agree with everything Jefferson says and still accept that Grey Walter's tortoises had revealed something remarkable, namely, that artificially intelligent behavior could be created by relatively simple mechanisms following simple rules. Grey Walter went on to give over twenty broadcasts for the BBC, including television and overseas broadcasts. The leading American cyberneticist at this time was Norbert Wiener. His broadcast on the BBC on April 30, 1951, was titled "The New Industrial Revolution." Wiener was one of the first scientists on the early BBC radio broadcasts who recognized that the new computers could potentially raise social issues. He recognized that the new machines were emerging into a world of conflicting interests and unequal distributions of power and could be appropriated for socially contentious ends. He also recognized the crucial role of economics in determining how the machines would be exploited industrially: "As to the cost of these machines, it will probably go down . . . to the level perhaps of hundreds of pounds. When you consider that this is the order of price, not of the whole factory . . . of labourers, but of the single labourer, you will see that the machine has a great economic argument for it. . . . 
Conclusion
In the post-World War II period, attempts to attach significance to the newly developing computers and cybernetic devices began even as the machines were under development. The fact that computers could perform complex calculations quickly was not itself contentious. Rather, there was a sense that these machines could have a significance over and above their prosaic functions, and this was related to their apparent autonomy and ability (in some people's opinion) to give at least a semblance of intelligence. This stimulated the debates discussed here.
In connection with the newly developing computers and cybernetics, we see two pronounced trends in the way computers were presented in broadcast expositions. One way was as an uncontentious tool for calculation. The other was as a basis for conceptual explorations of thought and intelligence. In this latter framing, the value of the computer lay in what it might suggest about the way humans and animals thought or what the limits of artificial intelligence might be. For example, in a letter to the cyberneticist Ross Ashby in 1946, Alan Turing wrote: "In working on the ACE [the National Physical Laboratory computer] I am more interested in the possibility of producing models of the action of the brain than in the practical applications of computing."
52 For cyberneticists such as Grey Walter, the devices they constructed had no other purpose than to elucidate possible brain processes by emulating aspects of the brain.
When we look at the backgrounds of the broadcasters discussed here, we see they represent two principal intellectual traditions and areas of interest. One group had a background in mathematics, physics, or engineering. I will refer to this group as "physical scientists." The other group had a more interdisciplinary background that included a strong component of biology or neurology.
53 I suggest these two groupings constitute two "relevant social groups," as defined earlier.
In relation to the newly emerging fields of computing and cybernetics, the two groups had very different interpretations of what these new devices signified. For the physical scientists such as Hartree, Newman, and MacKay, the new computers were essentially calculating machines, and speculation about their potential for thinking was fanciful. They argued their case reductively by referring to the fundamental processes on which computers operated and by emphasizing the deterministic nature of algorithmic programs. Turing, though a physical scientist, was an exception. His reluctance to accept such reductive arguments and his interest in computers for modeling brain processes aligns him with the more biologically informed cyberneticists. But Turing was interested in biology, and the last few years of his life were devoted to computer-based biological research. Similarly, Geoffrey Jefferson was an exception from the neurological camp. He took a skeptical line on cybernetics and computers as models of brain behavior, but his skepticism was not based on the type of reductive arguments used by the physical scientists.
What might the implications of this article be for the presentation of the history of information technology? Curators of historical museums already know that stories of technical progress from the past to the present can be simplistic and misleading. They will not be surprised to read that in the early days of digital computers there was no clear consensus on the correct interpretation of their significance. For modern curators, the story told here offers further confirmation (if it were needed) that technology is not deterministic.
I suggest, though, that what gives radio broadcasts such as these particular interest to historians and curators is their demonstration of social shaping in operation. Not only do these broadcasts give a perspective on what individuals and groups in the scientific community thought about the new technology, but they also give a perspective on what they believed other people should think about it. The fact that these views were delivered over the BBC was itself significant in terms of social shaping in view of the universality of the BBC's reach. Paddy Scannell has written: "[BBC Radio] addressed not the particular publics of the daily newspapers, not the specialised readership of the Left Book Club, not the tiny audiences for documentary films, but the general public, society at large." 54 The BBC's universality gave its output a significance over and above that of the print media. Its role was not merely to disseminate cultural productions but also to foster discernment; its reputation for authoritativeness made it an especially attractive and persuasive outlet for anyone wishing to advance a particular interpretation of contemporary developments.
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Afterword
Many more BBC broadcasts related to computers and brain-like behavior were given in the immediate postwar period than I have been able to discuss here, but I would contend that these conclusions are largely upheld when the other broadcasts are taken into account. The appendix to this article lists the broadcasts I learned of through my research. 
Notes
